We propose a chaos-based physically-enhanced secure scheme for orthogonal frequency division multiplexing-based passive optical network (OFDM-PON). This scheme employs a pseudorandom number sequence generated by a chaotic logistic map to control the frequencies of RF subcarriers. Due to the characteristic of chaos, these chaotic frequencies of RF subcarriers are difficult to be decrypted by an eavesdropper, which could greatly enhance the security of OFDM-PON. An experiment with 10-Gb/s 16 QAM-OFDM data is successfully transmitted over 20-km fiber, and it has confirmed that the proposed security scheme can protect the system from an eavesdropper or attacker, while keep a good performance for legal optical network units.
Introduction
passive optical network (PON) has been widely deployed for its high access speed and low cost [1] - [3] . Furthermore, orthogonal frequency division multiplexing-based passive optical network (OFDM-PON) is considered as a promising candidate for next generation PON, due to its high spectrum efficiency, strong inherent tolerance to fiber dispersion, and significant system flexibility [4] . However, the downstream signal is broadcasted to all optical network units (ONUs) in an OFDM-PON system. An adversary can tap or jam the transmitted signal by using reflection at a power splitter and frequent service interactions, as well as out-of-band and in-band crosstalk in an optical multiplexer/de-multiplexer [5] , [6] . Therefore, a reliable data transmission in OFDM-PON that can provide effective data authentication, confidentiality, integrity, access control and availability against eavesdropping from an adversary becomes increasingly prominent for optical access networks. At present, various data encryption schemes have been exploited to improve the security in the optical access networks. However, most of these schemes are focused on the encryption at the upper layers of PON access networks. These technologies encrypt the data frames, but leave the control frames and the headers unprotected, which is a risky practice to build security on the upper layers of an insecure foundation. As a result, the physical layer security has attracted overwhelming research interest all around the world. Due to the intrinsic privacy properties, the chaos-based communication has been considered as a promising technology that can be deployed in the physical secure OFDM-PON [7] - [11] .
Recently, [7] , [8] have proposed the chaos based IQ encryptions to enhance the physical layer security of OFDM-PON. [9] - [11] have proposed the chaos-based frequency domain and time domain information scrambling techniques, and the data on both frequency and time domains are encrypted through the chaotic mapped scrambling matrices. Furthermore, [12] , [13] have proposed the constellation-masked secure communication techniques. The key management in the physical layer of OFDM-PON has been investigated and a pilot-aided key agreement technique has been also proposed in [14] . Refs. [15] , [16] have proposed the modified active constellation extension and the partial transmit sequence, which can simultaneously improve the security and reduce the peak to average power ratio (PAPR). Additionally, [17] - [19] have utilized the hybrid chaotic system and the fractional Fourier transformation to enhance the physical layer security of the OFDM-PON. However, these physical layer security enhancement techniques do not consider the channel characters of OFDM-PON system. Actually, the channel characters of OFDM-PON system can also be utilized to enhance the physical layer security.
In this paper, we propose a chaotic pseudorandom RF subcarrier based security enhancement technique for optical OFDM-PON. In this scheme, the channel characters of OFDM-PON system are utilized to enhance the physical layer security, and the frequency of RF subcarrier varies among some special values in a pseudorandom number sequence. Then the data symbols are embedded into the chaotic pseudorandom RF subcarrier at the transmitter, which is further synchronized at the receiver for recovering the encrypted information.
Principle
The block diagram of the proposed secure OFDM-PON is shown in Fig. 1 , where a chaotic map is adopted to generate a pseudorandom number sequence, which is then employed to control the frequencies of RF subcarriers in both the transmitter and the receiver. Meanwhile, a key number sequence is also generated by using a chaotic map. With the help of this key number sequence, the RF subcarriers with the pseudorandom frequencies are obtained. Then they are used to up-convert the OFDM signals with an IQ-mixer. Finally, the physically encrypted OFDM signals are achieved. In this scheme, a one-dimensional logistic map is adopted as the chaotic model, which is shown by,
Where r is the bifurcation parameter, x t is the state value in time t, and x 0 is the arbitrary value between 0 and 1. Normally, when r falls into the domain of 3.57<rࣘ4, the system evolution will fall into chaos [20] . In this scheme, the initial value x 0 and the bifurcation parameter r are set as the security keys.
The time domain RF signals with chaos scrambling can be then expressed by,
Where F is the RF subcarrier frequency vector, and F = {f 1 , f i , . . . , f N }, P t is the "0-1" chaotic pseudorandom vector. As we know, only when the frequency element f i is in a certain range, the OFDM-PON system can work. Fig. 2 shows the Q-factor performance of the OFDM-PON employing RF subcarriers with different frequencies.
As shown in Fig. 2 , when the frequency is below 2 GHz or over 4.2 GHz, the Q-factor is below the FEC Limit, which indicates that the frequency element f i must be between 2 GHz and 4.2 GHz. To obtain the RF subcarrier frequency vector F, the frequency domain 2-4.2 GHz is divided to N sub-domains. The central frequency of every sub-domain is set as the RF subcarrier frequency f i , which can be given as,
By using f i , the RF subcarrier frequency vector F = {f 1 , f i , . . . , f N } can be obtained. In Eq. (2), P t is a "0-1" pseudorandom vector, which is defined as,
Where only one element of vector P t is one and the other elements are all zero.
To obtain a pseudorandom vector P t , the chaos domain (0, 1) is divided into N sub-domains. The sub-domains are numbered from 1 to N and each number indicates a position of "1" in the pseudorandom vector P t . The nth sub-domain can be expressed as,
At the transmitter, after Logistic map iterating a certain step with the security keys, the state value x t would fall into a specific sub-domain S n . To obtain the "0-1" pseudorandom vector P t , the sub-index of the sub-domain S n is extracted. The position of "1" in P t can be expressed by, Where Extract represents extracting the sub-index of the sub-domain. Then, the obtained P t can be expressed by,
Due to the chaos nature of the Logistic map, the state value x t will be an unpredictable parameter. Thus p os and P t are also unpredictable. Furthermore the RF subcarrier S RF (t) will be unpredictable. Owing to the mixing property of chaotic dynamical systems, the position of "1" in P t will randomly vary between 1 and N. As a result, the RF subcarriers at different time-slots will be random.
At the receiver, to decrypt the received encrypted OFDM signals, the same security keys as in the transmitter are used to generate the p os and P t . Owing to the chaotic characteristic of the Logistic map, when the security keys between the transmitter and the receiver are synchronous, then p os and P t will be synchronous. The security key synchronization between the transmitter and the receiver is performed by using the centralized key management. With the obtained p os and P t , the receiver can correctly recover the transmitted information of the proposed OFDM-PON system.
Experimental Setup and Results
The secure OFDM-PON system is provided to verify the performance of the proposed physical layer security enhancement technique, as shown in Fig. 3 . The downstream pseudorandom binary sequence (PRBS) signals experience OFDM modulation through offline DSP processing to obtain the OFDM signals. The pseudorandom vector P t is generated with the security keys in DSP. By using P t , the RF generator generates the RF carrier S RF (t) with a pseudorandom frequency. Then the OFDM signal is up-converted to S RF (t). After that, the encrypted OFDM signal is obtained. Where the encrypted OFDM is intensity modulated. After passing through Er-doped fiber amplifier (EDFA), fiber and optical filter, the optical signal is detected by a photodiode. The same S RF (t) as in the OLT is generated by using the RF generator. After down-conversion, the received signal is OFDM demodulated. Finally, the transmitted information is recovered. The frequencies of the generated RF subcarriers are presented in Fig. 4 , where N is set to 100 and 100 frequency values can be obtained. From Fig. 4 , we can see that the frequencies irregularly and randomly vary between 2 and 4.2 GHz.
In this scheme, the frequencies of RF subcarriers are designed to change at a fixed interval. For simplicity, the interval is set to 10 −8 s. The time domain waveforms of RF subcarriers with the frequencies of {2.781 GHz, 3.991 GHz, 2.737 GHz, 3.947 GHz, 2.913 GHz} are shown in Fig. 5 . Note that different colors are utilized to distinguish different frequency signals.
At the ONU side, the same security keys are deployed to generate the down-converted RF subcarriers, which can decrypt the information from the received scrambled OFDM signal. With different RF frequency mismatching, the system performance is studied in the experiment. Here the mismatch is the frequency error of the RF subcarriers between the transmitter and the receiver. The system performance with this mismatch varying from −0.1 to 0.1 is given in Fig. 6 . f c and f c are the frequencies of RF subcarriers in the receiver and the transmitter, respectively. In Fig. 6 , different points present different mismatches and a difference between two adjacent points is 10 MHz. The Q-factor threshold which can ensure the system error-free transmission is 9.2 dB. It is shown that only when the mismatch is about 0, the decryption process can work properly. Since an illegal ONU does not have a RF subcarrier with an identical frequency, it cannot decipher the scrambled OFDM signal. Then these confirm that the system is robustness against eavesdropping. In the proposed scheme, the initial value x 0 and the bifurcation parameter r are set as the security keys. If a single-float value is adopted, the key space size of the proposed physical layer technique is 4.3 × 10 −29 . The time complexity of the pseudorandom RF carriers generation is O(N). In conclusion, the proposed physical layer security technique has high security and low complexity. In the following experiment, the performance of an OFDM signal with 3 GHz bandwidth is exploited. The electrical waveforms and spectra with the RF carrier frequency of 3.991 GHz are shown in Figs. 7(a) and (b) , respectively. The optical spectrum of the transmitted OFDM signal and the electrical spectrum of the received OFDM signal are shown in Figs. 7(c) and (d) , respectively.
The bit error rate (BER) performance for an illegal ONU and different regular ONUs is investigated, and the measured BER curves are shown in Fig. 8(a) . For a regular ONU, when the received optical power is above −21.4 dBm and −19.8 dBm, the measured BERs for 4-QAM and 16-QAM OFDM signals after 20 km fiber transmission are below 10 −3 (FEC Limit), indicating that this regular ONU can correctly recover the transmitted data. However, for an illegal ONU, the BER is always about 0.5 for any received optical power, which indicates that it cannot decrypt the information from the received encrypted OFDM signal. Therefore, the proposed physical layer security technique can protect the transmitted OFDM signal from eavesdropping. Additionally, the BER curves for 4-QAM and 16-QAM OFDM signals after back-to-back (B2B) transmission are measured, as shown in Fig. 8 . The optical power penalty between 20 km fiber transmission and B2B transmission is less than 0.2 dB, which can verify that the performance of the encrypted OFDM signals after 20 km fiber transmission is similar to the performance after B2B transmission. In conclusion, the proposed physical layer security technique can protect the transmitted OFDM signals and meanwhile maintain its transmission performance. The received constellations in the positions of A, B, C and D in Fig. 8(a) are shown in Fig. 8(b) . A and B represent the correctly decrypted constellations, while C and D represent the incorrectly decrypted constellations. These results can also verify that the proposed scheme has a good transmission performance for regular ONUs and an excellent resistance to eavesdropping from any illegal ONU.
Conclusions
A physically-enhanced secure scheme for OFDM-PON by using chaotic pseudorandom RF subcarriers has been proposed. The obtained experimental results have confirmed that it can enhance the physical security level of OFDM-PON, and meanwhile it does not affect the BER performance. This scheme can be employed easily since it just needs an adjustable RF signal generator and DSP to control the generator. Furthermore, the proposed technique can be implemented for the bidirectional communication between OLT and ONU. Therefore, the proposed technique can be a promising candidate for future secure OFDM-PON systems.
